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Abstract 
The Summary for Policymakers of Working Group I (WGI) contribution to the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) presents three probabilities with 
different cumulative emissions to limit the global temperature rise to 2°C or less. In this paper, based on 
the latest information, allocation quotas for major countries and regions were determined under typical 
schemes between 2011 and 2100. It was found that the countries’ allocation quotas all increase with 
enlarging global emissions permit but with different growth rates under each allocation regime, and given 
global emission permit, changing in scheme parameters also has some impact on each country’s 
allocation quota. Allocation regimes were also evaluated from the perspective of equality based on 
cumulative emission per capita, finding that the regimes considering historical responsibility for 
emissions can effectively reduce the inequalities of global emissions; And  regimes incorporating ability 
to pay are useful in further reducing emissions inequalities between Annex I and non-Annex I groups. 
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1. Introduction 
Climate change is a global issue that can only be resolved by all countries working together, yet it is 
doubtful that each country’s interest is currently aligned with this goal. To determine emission allowances, 
institutions and scholars worldwide have, from various perspectives, proposed burden-sharing regimes [1-5]. 
These regimes can be rationally analyzed, compared and fairly assessed to find advantages and 
disadvantages that will be helpful in future negotiations. In this paper, the allowances of the major 
countries or regions are first calculated for different burden-sharing regimes under global emission 
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constraints established in the IPCC Fifth Assessment report (WGI). The paper then discusses the 
allocation equality of each regime from the perspective of per capita cumulative emissions. 
2. Allocation regimes and datasets 
There are a large number of effort-sharing approaches applied to emissions allocation. This study 
included the following typical schemes, which specific descriptions seen Refs.[1-5]: ability to pay (AP); 
contraction and convergence (CC); common but differentiated convergence (CDC); convergence for per 
capita and per capita cumulative emission (C2C); equal per capita cumulative emission (EPCCE); 
emission intensity convergence (EIC); emission intensity targets (EIT); equal per capita annual emission 
(EPC); greenhouse development rights (GDR); grandfathering (GF); multi-criteria convergence (MCC); 
multi-stage approach (MS); and the similar Brazilian proposal (SBP). In order to evaluate the impact of 
different scheme parameters, name like AP5000 (AP7500) was used in this paper, which means that the 
participation threshold was 5000$ (7500). The data sets used in CO2 emissions allowances—historical 
data, a baseline scenario, and global pathways, where the global emission pathways were constructed 
based on the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), which provides the cumulative data since 1860 to 
limit temperature rise to less than 2°C, with a probability of >33%, 50% and 66%. In the following 
sections, P33, P50 and P66 represent a 33%, 50% or 66% chance of limiting the temperature rise to 2°C.  
3. Results 
3.1 Allocation allowances 
 
Fig. 1. Main countries’ emissions quota allocations (a)in 2030; (b) in 2050 
Fig.1a and Fig.1b present the emission quota allocations for China, India, the European Union, the 
United States, non-Annex I countries and Annex I countries as a whole for 2030 and 2050. The three 
columns from left to right correspond to P66, P50 and P33. As the likelihood of limiting the temperature 
rise to 2°C decreased from 66% to 33% (with commensurate growth in global emissions), the allocation 
under the each scheme increased, although the rate of increase varied. As can be seen in Fig. 1a, under 
P33, the quotas of China, India, and non-Annex I countries in 2030 show a dissimilar degree increase 
over the values in 2010 with most regimes. However, under the stricter constraint of P66, the allocations 
for China, India and non-Annex I would decrease slightly relative to 2010 levels under some regimes. 
Conversely, even under the weaker constraint, the allocation allowances for the EU, the U.S. and Annex I 
countries would be lower than those in 2010 for all regimes, except MCC, EIC and GF. Under the more 
stringent conditions, allocations would decrease compared with the values in 2010 with all regimes. 
Notably, the EPCCE, SBP, GDR and C2C schemes would require the Annex I countries to achieve 
negative emissions. Fig.1a also indicates that Annex I countries would need immediate substantial 
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reductions in 2030 to meet their targets. In 2050, as shown in Fig. 1b, not only Annex I countries would 
need to have a significant decline compared with the 2010 values, but non-Annex I countries must also 
achieve different degrees of decline except those regimes considering historical responsibility. Broadly, 
non-Annex I countries would get higher quotas under the regimes based on historical responsibility, and 
lower quotas under regimes based on the status quo and emission intensity, contrary to Annex I countries. 
The future allocation quotas reflect equity principles underlying the various schemes, along with their 
relevant parameters. Using the CC and MCC as examples, when the convergence end-year changes from 
2050 to 2100, it is more beneficial for Annex I countries. Convergence date postponement gives 
developed countries longer periods of existing high per capita emissions than developing countries. By 
comparing the AP5000 and AP7500, it is evident that higher participation thresholds are more favorable 
for non-Annex I countries. This is because raising the threshold enables developing countries to achieve 
absolute emissions reductions later. 
3.2 Trade-off reduction targets: Annex I vs. non-Annex I 
Fig.2 shows the trade-off in relative targets for Annex I and non-Annex I countries as they achieve 
reduction target under different probabilities over the period 2010–2100. Under specific levels of global 
permit emissions, the reduction rates relative to the baselines of Annex I and non-Annex I countries have 
fixed relationships, illustrated in Fig.2. The three formulae have the same slope but with different 
intercepts, indicating that with lowering total emissions constraints the reduction rates for Annex I would 
fall significantly(when fixed reduction rates for non-Annex I). This indicates that to determine countries 
specific reduction rates need take the impact of global emissions permit into account. By increasing 
global emissions permit, the distribution of the schemes becomes increasingly dispersed, indicating that 
allocation allowances are simultaneously influenced by both regimes and constraints. For most schemes, 
as the possibility of limiting temperature rise declines, the gap between reduction rates of Annex I and 
non-Annex I countries widens. The regimes based on the proportion of the population, such as EPC, CC, 
C2C and EPCCE, display a trend whereby as the total emission constraint increases, the value of non-
Annex I reduction rate relative to the baseline minus the value of Annex I also grows. This indicates that 
these regimes are more beneficial for non-Annex I countries under higher total emissions constraints. 
However, the regimes based on the status quo and GDP are opposite to above situations. Other regimes 
such GDR, MS and AP have no fixed character that indicate similar results. These results suggest that 
with the increase of global emissions, countries quotas enlarge with different rates under each scheme.  
  
Fig. 2. Trade-off between Annex I and non-Annex I Fig. 3. Total and between-group Theil index 
3.3 Emission equality assessment 
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Theil index as an important equality assessment indicator is widely used in economics and resources 
areas, which was depicted in Ref. [6]. Fig.3 illustrates the total and between-group inequality under each 
allocation scheme. It can be seen that the regimes incorporating historical responsibility, namely EPCCE, 
SBP, C2C and GDR, have the lowest Theil index of all schemes. Fig.3 also shows that the changing 
sequences of total and between-group Theil indexes with various allocation regimes are not identical, 
indicating that some schemes are more effective than others in reducing between-group (Annex I and 
non-Annex I) inequality. This is true of the AP7500 regime; its between-group Thiel index is smaller than 
MS,CDC and EPC regimes, although its total inequality is larger than each. In addition, the regimes of 
GF, EIC, MCC and CC have higher total and between-group Theil indexes, which means that such 
schemes could not effectively reduce existing inequities. Generally, the regimes based on historical 
responsibility, such as EPCCE, SBP, C2C and GDR schemes, can effectively lower total unfairness. The 
earlier the cumulative initial years, the lower the fairness, demonstrated by the changing Theil index from 
C2C to EPCCE. This shows that those regimes considering historical responsibility can reduce historical 
emissions unfairness and maintain reasonable rights for developing countries. The regimes based on the 
capacity principle (GDR and AP schemes) are very effective in reducing between-group inequalities. The 
effect is also more obvious under enhanced thresholds, such as the change of AP5000 to AP7500. 
4. Conclusion 
Based on latest data of global emissions permit, this paper derives allocation allowances for major 
countries and regions under typical allocation schemes. In 2030, the allocation quotas for Annex I 
countries (in aggregate) would have declined significantly compared with those in 2010, especially under 
strict cumulative constraints, while the quotas for non-Annex I countries would have, as a whole, 
increased slightly under most schemes. This indicates that Annex I countries should take the lead in 
emissions reduction. Through the analysing each regime, it was found that the countries’ allocation 
quotas all increase with enhancing global emissions permit but with different growth rates under each 
allocation regime, and given global emission permit, changing in scheme parameters also has some 
impact on each country’s allocation quota. Finally, allocation regimes were evaluated from the 
perspective of equality, revealing that the regimes considering historical responsibilities (such as EPCCE, 
SBP, C2C and GDR) can effectively reduce global emissions inequality and safeguard reasonable rights 
for developing countries. In addition, the regimes based on ability to pay (such as AP and GDR) are 
useful in further reducing existing inequity between Annex I and non-Annex I. 
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